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THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF ENRON:
WHISTLEBLOWING UNDER THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT AFTER LAWSON V. FMR LLC
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the Securities Act of 1933 followed the United States Great
Depression1 and the recent Dodd-Frank legislation followed the subprime
mortgage crisis, 2 so did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sox") follow the
scandals of Enron, MCI/WorldCom, and other large corporations at the
turn of the new millennium.' By January 2001, "Enron Corporation was
the seventh largest company in America with over 21,000 employees and
operations in more than 30 countries" around the world.4 Before its
collapse, Enron was fraudulently boasting revenues of U.S. $138.7 billion.5
By December of that same year, Enron had declared bankruptcy. 6 The
widespread and large-scale fraud Enron had engaged in shocked its
investors and the country alike.

1 See A Brief History of Securities Regulation, ST.

OF Wis. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS,

https://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/regexemp/history.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (exploring
origins of securities regulation).
2 See Damien Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. FinancialLandscape:
Senate Passes Overhaul That Will Touch Most Americans; Bankers Gird for Fight Over Fine
Print,WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052748704682604575369030061839958
(examining
Dodd-Frank legislation's purpose in preventing another crisis like subprime mortgage crisis); see
also Matt Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral In The New Era of
Dodd-FrankAct "Bounty Hunting", 45 CONN. L. REv. 483, 486 (2012) ("The Dodd-Frank Act,
among other things, amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . by adding Section 21F
entitled 'Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection' to significantly expand the SEC's
existing whistleblower bounty program.").
3 See Vega, supra note 2, at 494-95 (illustrating scandalous backdrop motivating enactment
of Sox). Ironically, the case against one of the lead Enron fraudsters, Jeffrey Skilling, did not
conclude until 2013, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank legislation in response to a second
financial catastrophe. See Aaron Smith, Ex-Enron CEO Skilling Has 10 Years Lopped off
Sentence, CNN, June 21, 2013, http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/21/news/companies/skillingenron-resentencing/ (reporting final settlement of one of Enron-related criminal convictions).
4

MIRANDA H. FERRARA AND MICHELE P. LAMEAU, CORPORATE DISASTERS: WHAT WENT

WRONG AND WHY 100 (Miranda H. Ferrara & Michele P. LaMeau eds., 7th ed. 2012).
5 Ild. Much of this so-called revenue was generated by buying and selling the same gas or
electricity over and over again. See Dan Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES, Jan. 15, 2002,
http://www .forbes.com/2002/01/15/0115enron.html (explaining how revenue was generated).
6 FERRARA & LAMEAU, supra note 4.
7 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64
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Sox was enacted in response to Enron's fraud.8 Although Sox was
enacted to prevent future corporate fraud, the protective measures put in
place by Sox have not prevented fraud from continuing. 9 Most recently,
Alayne Fleischmann, a securities lawyer working for JPMorgan Chasealso known as the "$9 Billion Witness"-came forward in response to the
fraudulent lending practices of her former employer.1 0 As the recent
Supreme Court Case Lawson v. FMR, LLC 1 and a handful of subsequent
decisions have already exemplified, 12 whistleblowing continues to be an
S.C. L. REV. 1, 2 [hereinafter Moberly Ten Years Later] ("In 2001 and 2002, corporate scandals
exploded in the United States as the public learned about massive fraud at large companies such
as Enron and WorldCom.").
8 See Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1162 (2014) ("In the Enron scandal that
prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, contractors and subcontractors, including the accounting firm
Arthur Andersen, participated in Enron's fraud and its cover-up. When employees of those
contractors attempted to bring misconduct to light, they encountered retaliation by their
employers."); but see Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589,
1594 (2014) (differentiating Lawson arguing two types of securities regulation: public companies,
and investment companies and advisers).
The "Corporate Code of Silence" involved
discouraging employees, including attorneys, accountants, and auditors, from reporting concerns
about wrongdoing or inconsistencies. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1162-63 (detailing Corporate
Code of Silence aspect of Sox's enactment).
9 See, e.g., Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel
Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagen-diesel-carscandal.html? r=0 (reporting Volkswagen emissions fraud); Liz Rappaport, Auditors Face Fraud
Charge,WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052748704138604576029991727769366
(describing
Ernst & Young's potential involvement in Lehmen Brothers's Fraud in 2010); Sarah N. Lynch,
Diamond Foods to pay $5 million to settle SEC fraud case, REUTERS, Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-diamond- sec-accountingfraud-idUSBREA0813020140109
(describing Diamond Food Inc.'s fraud by misrepresenting cost of walnuts).
10 See Matt Taibbi, The $9 Billion Witness: Meet JPMorgan Chase's Worst Nightmare,
ROLLING STONE, Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-9-billion-witness20141106 (exploring JPMorgan Chase's mortgage fraud and Fleischmann's whistleblowing
under Dodd-Frank). Similar to Arthur Andersen and Enron, JPMorgan Chase had internal
policies against emailing concerns or problems related to the mortgages. ld. As Fleischmann
recalled, "if you sent him an email, he would actually come out and yell at you." Id.
(exemplifying informal cultures of silence that discourage reporting).
11 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). Lawson, in fact, was the Supreme Court's first decision
interpreting the whistleblower protection provision of Sox. See Jason Zuckerman, Jason C.
Schwartz, & Gabrielle Levin, Developments and Trends in Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Litigation, 8TH ANN. ABA SECTION OF LAB. AND EMP. L. CONF. 1, 1, 10, (Nov. 6,
2014), https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Developments-and-Trendsin-Sarbanes-Oxley-and-Dodd-Frank-Whistleblower-Litigation.pdf
(describing who can be
whistleblowers after Lawson).
12 See, e.g., Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59684, at
*8-16 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2014) (interpreting Lawson narrowly); Wiest v. Lynch, 15 F. Supp. 3d
543, 567-72 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding agency-based relationship pled as outlined in Lawson);
Gibney v. Evolution Mktg. Research, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 741, 744-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(interpreting Lawson narrowly).
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evolving area of law, with the goal of protecting investors from the type of
fraud that had been perpetrated by trusted advisers, professionals, and even
attorneys at companies like Enron. 3 This note examines in detail the
enactment of Sox, provides an overview of Sox whistleblowing claims,
explores the scope of the Sox whistleblower protection clause, and
identifies some unresolved issues relating to Sox's whistleblower
protection provision. Finally, this recommends that both public and private
employers implement an internal reporting system to encourage internal
communication around potential problems in order to facilitate prompt and
internal correction of these issues.
II. SOX ORIGIN
Enron was considered an innovative company, and it spearheaded
the kind of derivatives trading 14 practiced until Enron's collapsed in
2001.15 Despite its size, influence, and power, a number of short-sighted
business practices and bad deals led to substantial losses for Enron.16 After
these losses, Enron needed to borrow money in order to have capital to
operate.1 7 However, in order to look loan-worthy to its creditors Enron's

13 See supra notes 10-12 (giving examples of recent Sox whistleblower controversy); see
also Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 1 ("2014 has been an extremely important year for litigants
dealing with whistleblower claims brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010..."). This area of law is
likely to see acceleration in development as federal courts and administrative tribunals alike
handle a numerous, unresolved issues regarding Sox whistleblower claims. See Zuckerman,
supra note 11, at 1 ("The development of the law in this area is likely to continue to accelerate, as
administrative tribunals and federal courts grapple with a number of key, unresolved issues
regarding the scope of SOX and Dodd-Frank whistleblower claims.").
14 See Jeremy Kahn, Off Balance Sheet--and Out of Control, FORTUNE, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2002/02/1 8/318 145/index.htm
(explaining Enron's trading practices).

15 See Geoffrey Etherington & Brian P. Iaia, Regulation of Derivatives in a Post-Enron
World, 1 NO. 16 ANDREWS ENRON LITIG. REP. 4 (2002) (detailing Enron's collapsed along with
consequences).
16 See FERRARA & LAMEAU, supra note 4, at 101 (describing Enron's business dealings).
17 Id. Enron did this through a number of accounting methods, including placing debt in
Special Purpose Entities-colloquially known as shell companies-and market-to-market
accounting cost valuations. See id. at 101-02 (explaining role of SPEs). Enron created shell
companies specifically to isolate financial risk so it could be removed from Enron's financial
disclosures, while reporting the transaction as a revenue-generating "sale." Jeremy Kahn, Off
Balance Sheet-and Out of Control, FORTUNE, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2002/02/1 8/31 8145/index.htm
(explaining role of SPEs). See generally Steven Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of
Special Purpose Entities in corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 1323 (2002)
(explaining how Enron reporting those transactions was false revenue).
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financial statements needed drastic "cosmetic surgery."18
Enron's
fraudulent financial reporting was not immediately apparent because its
independent auditing firm, Arthur Andersen LLP, failed to identify the
problem.19 Furthermore, employees within Enron were rewarded with
lavish compensation for actively assisting Enron's fraudulent activity, 20
and Enron had strong policies encouraging silence among other employees
to keep its fraudulent activities from being discovered. 21 The fraud resulted
in one of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history.22 Seemingly overnight,
thousands of people lost jobs and billions of dollars in assets disappeared.23
Congress held investigative hearings following Enron's epic
collapse in order to determine how the country's corporate governance
system, law enforcement agencies, and anti-fraud measures failed to detect
the widespread deceptions of Enron, as well as other companies that had
engaged in similar fraudulent activity during this time frame.24 The
hearings revealed that many employees were aware of fraudulent activity,
but did not report it; it was effectively a "corporate code of silence. 25 Due
to the perceived code of silence, Congress included in the Sarbanes-Oxley
18
19

See Kahn, supra note 17 (describing evolvement of SPEs).
See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1162 (accusing accountants, along with Arthur Anderson LLP

with fraudulent activity within Enron); Etherington & Iaia, supra note 15 (noting Arthur
Anderson LLP failed with fraud prevention and corrective measures).
20 FERRARA & LAMEAU, supra note 4, at 101-02; see also William C. Powers, Raymond S.
Troubh, and Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp., FINDLAW (Feb. 1, 2002),
http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/enron/sicreport/ (discovering conflict of interest employees
operating the fraudulent shell companies did not disclose). Enron paid 140 executives a
combined total of over $680 million in 2001.
See Enron Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/ (last updated Apr. 26, 2015, 9:39 AM)
(listing history of Enron collapse). Kenneth Lay alone, one of the top executives spearheading
the fraud, received $67.4 million of that payout. Id.
21 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1162 (explaining employees who did speak up faced retaliation).
In fact, there was "abundant evidence that Enron had succeeded in perpetuating its massive
shareholder fraud in large part due to a 'corporate code of silence' . .. 'discourag[ing] employees
from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the
SEC, but even internally."' Id.; see Vega, supra note 2, 502-05 (arguing for increased emphasis
on internal reporting procedures for whistleblowing provisions).
22 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining fraud in bankruptcy context).
23 See id. at 2 n.3 (citing sources reviewing Enron's rapid change from 'most admired' to
,most despised' status following fraud).
24 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining Congress actions with
hearings). Moberly also refers readers to the Library of Congress's guide to the Enron hearings,
noting at least 10 different Congressional committees holding over forty-five different hearings.
See id. (citing Library of Congress, Guide to Law Online: Enron Hearings,LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (July 25, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.php (providing
access to hearing transcripts).
25 See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4-5 (2002) (recognizing Enron's "code of silence" with need
for reform).
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Act of 200226 "wide-ranging corporate governance provisions specific
sections related to whistleblowers. ' 2
During the congressional hearings, Sherron Watkins, who was an
internal accountant at Enron during its fraudulent activities, gave testimony
on both how the company manipulated its finances, 2 8 and how the company
retaliated against her for bringing that to the attention of the company CEO,
29
Ken Lay.
While not the case across the board,30 the Senate hearing
emphasized how Enron "did not consider firing [Arthur] Andersen
[Enron's outside accounting auditing firm]; rather, the company sought
advice on the legality of discharging the whistleblower."3 1 It was this
conduct, that "discouraged [employees] at nearly every turn" from blowing
the whistle on fraud that motivated the expansive Sox whistleblowing
provisions.12 The Senate had concluded that to encourage employees to
come forward with evidence of wrongdoing, the law needed (more) robust
protection from retaliation:
[C]orporate whistleblowers are left unprotected under
current law. This is a significant deficiency because often,
in complex fraud prosecutions, these insiders are the only

26

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2000) (codified in

scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (detailing Sox Whistleblower provision); see also Lawson,
134 S. Ct. at 1169 (exploring congress's intent when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A); Richard E.
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1117-25 (2006) [hereinafter Moberly Structural Model] (explaining
whistleblower's roles in Enron scandal); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An
Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 65, 74-75 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly Empirical Analysis] (explaining whistleblower
provision in Sox).
28 See The FinancialCollapse of Enron-Part3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 14-66 (2002),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 107hhrg77991/pdf/CHRG- 107hhrg77991.pdf (detailing
Sherron Watkin's congressional testimony).
29 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 5 (describing Sherron Watkin's testimony).
In fact, Enron's human resources department asked its outside counsel for advice on whether
Watkins could be fired after reporting accounting fraud, and outside counsel informed them that
no law prevented it. See Email from Carl Jordan, Attorney, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., to Sharon
Butcher,
Assistant
Gen.
Counsel,
Enron
(Aug
24,
2001,
7:02
PM),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/enron/exhibit/03-15/BBC-000I/Images/9810.001.PDF (discussing
legality of discharging whistleblower).
30 See Moberly Structural Model, supra note 27, at 1117 (examining WorldCom's board of
directors firing wrongdoer, not whistleblower).
31 See S. REP. No. 107-46, at 5 (producing email from Enron's outside counsel
regarding
"risks associated with discharging" whistleblower).
32 See id. at 5, 10 (explaining consequences faced by whistleblower when reporting on
fraud).
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firsthand witnesses to the fraud. They are the only people
who can testify as to "who knew what, and when," crucial
questions not only in the Enron matter, but [also] in all
complex securities fraud investigations. Although current
law protects many government employees who act in the
public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no similar
protection for employees of publically traded companies
who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors. With
one in every two Americans investing in public companies,
this distraction fails to serve the public good.33
The Senate, in drafting and enacting Sox, sought to provide that protection,
ultimately aiming to prevent corporate fraud.
The Sox whistleblowing provision amounted to a significant
broadening of federal whistleblower protection, especially compared to the
34
industry-specific and/or state-specific protections prior to Sox.
Furthermore, only a handful of states prior to Sox had statutes covering
private-sector whistleblowers.3 5 The breadth of coverage for private
employees varied significantly between states, so that employees had
difficulty predicting the scope of protection and differing treatment of
employees in large, national businesses.3 6 In the wake of Enron, Congress
decided to address this statutory "patchwork and vagaries" of state law, and
provide
a more consistent,
nationally-reaching
protection
for
whistleblowers. 3
III. SOX WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
Sox included a whistleblower protection provision to provide
protection for whistleblowers, enhance transparency in corporations, and

33 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 6 (quoting S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4-5.).
34 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 6-7 (referring to prior whistleblowing
protection statutes as "'silos' of protection"); see also PrivateSector Whistleblowers: Are There
Sufficient Legal Protections?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 2-3 (2007),
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1034&context=lawfacpub (statement
of Richard E. Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law).
35 See S. REP. No. 107-46, at 10 (noting inconsistent treatment of whistleblowers between
states).
36 See id. (listing forty states where employees could bring tort for retaliatory discharge).
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (creating private cause of action for whistleblowers when
there is a retaliatory discharge, under Sox); S. REP. No. 107-46, at 10 (noting inconsistent
treatment of whistleblowers between states).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
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ultimately prevent fraud.3 9 Sox makes it illegal for a covered-company to
fire or otherwise discriminate against an employee for providing
information or assisting with an investigation regarding what the employee
reasonably believes to be a violation of a rule of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the federal criminal laws regarding mail, wire, and
bank fraud, or any other federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.4 0 The protection of §1514A attaches when the employee
provides information of conduct he or she reasonably believes to be in
violation of an applicable rule or law.4 1 Once protected, §1514A makes it
illegal for the employer to retaliate against an employee.42
In order to receive the §1514A protections, an employee must file a
complaint with the Department of Labor-specifically, with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 43 A claim must be filed
within 180 days of the reported activity or 180 days from when the
employee should have known of the violation.44 OSHA then has 60 days to
investigate the complaint and issue a letter indicating whether or not it has
found reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred.45 If the
39 See Moberly Structural Model, supra note 27, at 1126-31 (explaining goal, impact,
and
significance of Sox's Whistleblower protection).
40 See Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 1-2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1), Sox Whistleblower

Protection statute). Dodd-Frank inserted the "reasonably believes" clause into 18 U.S.C. §
1514A, in order to further protect employees. Id. It is important to recognize, however, that Sox
borrowed the language for § 1514A from the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform
Act for the 21st Century ("AIR21"), and Sox set its burden of proof for plaintiffs accordingly.
See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1167 (explaining, under Sox, whistleblower actions "shall be
governed" by § 42121(b) of title 49).
41
See Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 2 (explaining how §1514A protections work).
Protected reporting includes when the employee provides information or assistance to a federal
regulatory agency, law enforcement agency, Congress, or even internally reporting to someone in
the company "with 'supervisory authority over the employee' or with authority to 'investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct."' ld. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
42 Id. Sox also amended the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), making it
illegal for employers to interfere with the livelihood of any person in retaliation for their
providing truthful reports to law enforcement officer. See id. (noting other avenue for employee
protection not limited to allegations of fraud).
43 See § 1514A(b) (detailing steps to seek relief for violation of subsection (a)); Filing
Whistleblower Complaints under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMIN. (Dec. 2011), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha-factsheet-sox-act.pdf [hereinafter
OSHA Fact Sheet ] (outlining requirements, rights, procedure of § 15 14A protections and claims).
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (outlining timeline for claim); see also OSHA Fact Sheet,
supra note 43 (outlining requirements, rights, procedure of § 1514A protections and claims). This
180 day statute of limitations is significantly larger than some other whistleblower protection
provisions. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (requiring reports within 30 days);
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (requiring reports within 30 days); Wendell
H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (requiring
reports within 90 days).
45 See Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 4 (recognizing in practice OSHA typically takes
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Department of Labor makes a determination within 180 days, the complaint
is tried administratively, but is appealable to the federal courts.46 If the
Department of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180 days of
filing the complaint, the employee is "entitled to a trial by jury" and may
file his case directly to the federal district court.4
Sox borrowed the language for § 1514A from the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,48 also known as
AIR 21, and Sox set its burden of proof for plaintiffs to be the same as AIR
21.49
This is a more plaintiff-employee friendly burden than most
whistleblower statutes.50 Under the contributing factor standard, once an
employee satisfies his or her burden the burden shifts to the employer who
now must prove-by clear and convincing evidence-that it would have
taken the same actions regardless of the employee's whistleblowing. 1
Many, though not all, considered Sox's broad applicability,
employee-plaintiff friendly burdens of proof, and other protections, to have

"considerably longer").
46 See id. at 4-5 (offering more detail on administrative process).
47 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(1)(B), 1514A(b)(2)(E) (2015) (proceedings in these situations
will be reviewed de novo).
48 See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 1162 (2014) (comparing Sox to whistlerblower
model, 49 U.S.C. § 42121).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (stating burden of proof is governed by 49 U.S.C. §
42121(b)); see also Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,
PUB. L. No. 106-181, § 519(a), 114 Stat. 61 (reproducing 49 U.S.C. § 42121); William Hartsfield,
2 INVESTIG. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 12:34 ("Proceedings under Sarbanes-Oxley are governed by
the rules and procedures and burdens of proof of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century.").
Sox provides that, with few exceptions, whistleblower
actions "shall be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in § 42121(B) of title 49." 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(c). In other words, the "heightened pleading standards established in
federal courts may not be applied" to Sox claims. See Hartsfield, supra (explaining differences
between Sox whistleblower claims and other whistleblower claims).
50 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 8. Under § 1514A, employees must merely
prove that the whistleblowing was a motivating factor for the retaliatory conduct. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1) (describing elements); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b) (2011) (describing elements).
Both the Department of Labor, which handles many whistleblowing claims, and many legal
scholars consider the "motivating factor" standard much easier for plaintiffs to prove than the
typical discrimination standard of employer "mixed-motive." See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn et al.,
Employment Law: Private Ordering and Its Limitations 224-25 (2007) ("Congress's use of
Icontributing factor' in Sarbanes-Oxley suggests the same or perhaps even a lower level of
causation [than] motivating factor causation."); Moberly Empirical Analysis, supra note 27, at 80
(comparing contributing factor causation to mixed-motive causation). Furthermore, the statute of
limitations period only begins running once the employee-complainant knows or reasonably
should have known that the employer's conduct to the employee was actionable. See Hartsfield,
supra note 49, at § 12:34 (explaining Sox statute).
51 See 29 C.F.R. Part 1980.104(e) (codifying burden shifting of whistleblower protection
claims).
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significantly improved whistleblower protection in the United States.52
Sox has been modified since its enactment, such as: subsequent statutes
adding a refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as protected activity,53
increasing statute of limitations period,54 prohibiting employees from
waiving their rights under § 1514A, such as with arbitration agreements,
and the Dodd-Frank Act
Sox to prohibit associational
S• 56 amended
discrimination as retaliation.
Political party did not seem to matter when
these statutes were enacted, with both Republican and Democratic
presidents signing whistleblower laws. 5
IV. COURTS CONSIDER THE SCOPE OF §1514A.
A. Split Interpretations
The Plaintiffs in Lawson were employees of companies that
contracted to advise or manage mutual funds. 58 Generally speaking,
52 Compare Moberly Ten Years

Later, supra note 7, at nn.8-9

(considering

Sox

Whistleblowing favorably), with Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH.
L. REV. 1029, 1-34 (2004) (considering Sox an inadequate "half-measure.").
53 See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 402, 124 Stat
3885, 3968 (2011); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1057(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2031-32 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1558, 18C(a)(5), 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010); Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, § 6, 116 Stat. 2985, 2989 (2002).
54 See, e.g., § 402, 124 Stat. at 3968 (stating limitation period is 180 days); § 1057(a)(4), 124
Stat. at 1744 (stating limitation period is two years); § 1057(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1846 (stating
limitation period is six years); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1558, 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) (stating limitation period is 180 days); Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, § 6, 116 Stat. 2985, 2990 (2002) (stating
limitation period is 180 days). Dodd-Frank changed the limitation period from 90 days to 180
days, and clarified that the period began running only once an employee becomes aware that he or
she has been retaliated against. Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 16 (citing §
1057(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1848).
55 See § 748, 124 Stat. at 1746 (providing rights may not be waived through agreements and
arbitration agreements are invalid); §1057(d), 124 Stat. at 2035 (providing rights may not be
waived through agreements and arbitration agreements are invalid). But see § 402, 124 Stat. at
3971 (prohibiting employee waiver, but silent on pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
Furthermore, the employee may be entitled to a de novo hearing. See Hartsfield, supra note 49, at
§ 12:34 (detailing employee's rights).
56 See § 1057(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 2031 (prohibiting discrimination).
57 See Moberly Ten Years Later, supra note 7, at 16 (recognizing that anti-retaliatory
provisions were passed under both President Bush and President Obama). Professor Moberly
notes with interest that nearly all of President Obama's signature legislation-healthcare reform,
financial industry reform, and the economic stimulus bill-contained anti-retaliation provisions.
Id.
58 Lawson v. FMRLLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014).

118

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

mutual funds are public companies that do not have any employees.59
Instead, their management or advising is contracted or subcontracted to
other companies, who handle those mutual funds' day-to-day operations.60
There were two plaintiffs in this case. 61 The first plaintiff is Lawson, who
was employed by Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC, a subsidiary of FMR
Corp., which was succeeded by FMR LLC ("FMR"), the named
defendant. 62 The second plaintiff, Zang, was employed by a different FMR
subsidiary, but due to the subsidiary's shared parent company, and for
convenience, the two cases were treated collectively as FMR. 63 Having
worked for FMR for fourteen years, Lawson was serving as a Senior
Director of Finance before raising concerns regarding FMR's accounting
practices. 64 Zang, who worked for FMR for eight years, was employed as a
portfolio manager for several funds when he reported concerns about
inaccuracies in a draft SEC registration statement concerning certain
funds. 65 FMR moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that neither plaintiff had
66
a claim under § 1514A because FMR was a private company.
The
district court rejected FMR's interpretation of § 1514A, denying the motion
67
to dismiss.
FMR filed an interlocutory appeal, where a divided First
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and granted FMR's motion to
dismiss.68
The majority in the FMR interlocutory appeal (FMR Appeal)
accepted that FMR was a contractor within the meaning of § 1514A(a), and
therefore among the actors prohibited from retaliating against employees
engaging in protected activity. 69 However, the First Circuit agreed with
FMR's argument that "an employee" in § 1514A(a) refers to only
employees of public companies.
In other words, § 1514A, under the First
Circuit's interpretation, would protect only employees of the public

59 Id.
60 See id. ("...include[ing] making investment decisions, preparing reports for shareholders,

and filing reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).").
61 Id. at 1164.
62 See id.

63 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1164 (explaining treatment of cases).
64 See id. ("[Lawson] believ[ed] that [FMR] overstated expenses associated with operating
the mutual funds.")
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 141, 167 (Mass. 2010) (denying FMR's motion
to dismiss Sox claim).
68 See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F. 3d 61, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining court is bound by
text of statute).
69 See id. at 68-80 (explaining holding).
70 Id.
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company the fraud is reported against, but would not protect employees of
companies contracted by public companies even if it is the contractor's
employees who recognize and report potential fraud. Judge Thompson
alone dissented from the First Circuit's ruling. 1 In her view, the majority's
view "impose[d] an unwarranted restriction on the intentionally broad
language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . ..bar[ring] a significant class of

potential securities fraud whistleblowers form any legal protection." ' 2
A few months later, the Department of Labor's Administration
Review Board ("ARB") issued a decision in an unrelated case-Spinner v.
David Landau & Assoc., LLC7 -disagreeing
with the First Circuit's
interpretation of § 1514A in Lawson. The whistleblower in Spinner was
an employee of an accounting firm that provided auditing, consulting, and,
ironically, Sarbanes-Oxley compliance services to a public company.
The ARB explained that § 1514A affords whistleblower protection to
employees of privately held contractors that render services to public
companies. 6
With the differing interpretations of the First Circuit and the ARB
opinion and Judge Thompson's dissent, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
Lawson.
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In
8
On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court in Lawson v. FMR LLC7
took up the issue of the definition of the protected class under Sox's
whistleblower protection provision, § 1514A.79 The Court, interpreting §

71

Id. at 83.

72

Id.

73 Administrator's Final Decision and Order of Remand, Spinner v. David Landau & Assoc.,

LLC, Docket No. 2010-SOX-029 (Dep't of Labor May 31, 2012).
74 See id.(distinguishing Lawson); Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1164-65.
75 See Administrator's Final Decision and Order of Remand, Spinner v. David Landau &
Assoc., LLC, Docket No. 2010-SOX-029 (Dep't of Labor May 31, 2012) (describing Spinner's
role).
76

Id.

77

Id. at 1164-65.

78

134 S.Ct. 1158 (2014).

79 See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) ("This case concerns the

definition of the protected class: Does [§ 1514A] shield only those employed by the public
company itself, or does it shield as well employees of privately held contractors and
subcontractors-for example, investment advisers, law firms, accounting enterprises-who
perform work for the public company?"). The Court's decision is especially significant when
placed in the context of its stance on securities cases during the "Roberts Era". See John C.
Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIz. L. REv. 1,
22 (discussing Lawson in context of Justices' voting affiliations). Voting on Lawson was
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1514A, held that "based on the text of § 1514A, the mischief to which
Congress was responding, and earlier legislation Congress drew upon, that
the provision shelters employees of private contractors and subcontractors,
just as it shelters employees of the public company served by the
contractors and subcontractors." 80
This overturned the First Circuit
majority, ruling in line with Judge Thompson's dissent and the ARB's case
in Spinner.81
The Supreme Court came to its interpretation using a few different
interpretive methods. First, it looked to the language of the statute, "giving
the words used their ordinary meaning."8 2 Using this approach, and
agreeing explicitly with Judge Thompson's dissent, the Court found that
"boiling [§ 1514A] down to its relevant syntactic elements, it provides that
'no... contractor... may discharge.., an employee."' 8 3 The Court held
that, in order to follow FMR's argument and the First Circuit's reasoning,
84
the words "of a public company" must be inserted after "an employee."
The Court made it clear that, "[a]bsent any textual qualification, we
presume the operative language to mean what it appears to mean: [a]
contractor may not retaliate against its own employee for engaging in
protected whistleblowing activity."8 5 Furthermore, the prohibited
retaliatory measures-demotion, harassment, or other changes to condition
of employment-are those measures that an employer would take against
its own employees. 8 6 To hold that Sox would not apply to employees of
contractors working for public companies, would make the inclusion of
"contractors" and "subcontractors" in § 1514A insignificant.8 Therefore,
reading the plain text of § 1514A, the Sox whistleblower provision
included employees of contractors as well as those of public companies.88

"relatively unusual," and the majority "included three left- and three right-leaning Justices." ld.
at 22.
8o Lawson, 1345 S. Ct. at 1160-161.
81 See supra section IV.A (comparing 1st Circuit majority in Lawson with ARB Spinner
decision).
82 Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1165 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)).
83 ld. (quoting Lawson, 670 F.3d at 84 (Thompson, J., dissenting)).
84 See id. (exploring other Sox provisions which place "an employee" in provisions).
85 See id. at 1166 ("Contractors are not ordinarily positioned to take adverse actions against
employees of the public company with whom they contract. FMR's interpretation of § 1514A,
therefore, would shrink to insignificance the provision's ban on retaliation by contractors.").
86 Id.
87 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1165 (explaining purpose of provision is prevention of another
Enron scandal).
88 See id. at 1166 ("Absent any textual qualification, we presume the operative language
means what it appears to mean: A contractor may not retaliate against its own employee for
engaging in protected whistleblowing activity.").
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The Court further identified that it is common knowledge §151 4A
was enacted as part of the Sox statutory scheme to prevent another Enron
debacle.8 9 The Supreme Court accepted ARB's observation that Congress
had recognized "that outside professionals-accountants, law firms,
contractors, agents, and the like-were complicit in, if not integral to, the
shareholder fraud and subsequent cover-up [Enron] officers
perpetrated." 90 The Court goes so far as to say that Congress was focused
on the role of Enron's outside contractors facilitating Enron's own internal
fraud, when enacting Sox. 91
The Supreme Court also found further reason to interpret § 151 4A
as extending to employees of contractors: "employees gain protection for
furnishing information to.

.

. 'a person with supervisory authority over the

employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct)."' 92 The
reference to employer knowledge is an additional indicator of Congress'
expectation that the retaliator § 151 4A protects against will typically be the
employee's employer, which in Lawson was the independent contractor to
FMR. 93
Another consideration in Lawson was that to read § 1514A as not
applying to employees of contractors, at least in regards to the mutual fund
industry, would insulate virtually the entire mutual fund industry where
mutual funds typically have no employees of their own. 94 The Court
specified that "[t]hese investment advisers, under our reading of § 1514A,
are contractors prohibited from retaliating against their own employees for
engaging in whistleblowing activity."' 95 While the First Circuit relied on
protection against fraud in other provisions of Sox and other statutes, the
Supreme Court held that separate protection does not remove the problem
of protection for employees, which is specifically provided for only in §
1514A. 96

89
90

See id.
at 1169 (citing S. Rep., at 2-11) (explaining reasons for enacting Sox).
See id.(quoting Spinner, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-029, at. 12-13) (providing textual analysis

for § 1514A).
91 See id.
(explaining purpose of § 1514A).
92 Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1167.
93

Id.

94 See id.
at 1170 (rejecting FMR's argument).
95 See id.. at 1171 ("This construction protects the 'insiders [who] are the only firsthand
witnesses to the [shareholder] fraud."').
96 See id. at 1172 ("Indeed, affording whistleblower protection to mutual fund investment

advisers is crucial to Sarbanes-Oxley's endeavor to protect investors.
omitted).

)

(internal citations
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C. In the Wake of Lawson, Continued Questioning on the Reach of§ 1514A
While the ruling in Lawson is unquestioned in regards to the extent
of § 1514A's coverage to investment companies, and unquestioned in
regards to the kinds of contractors who assisted in Enron's fraud, the
eastern district court of Pennsylvania in Gibney v. Evolution Mktg.
Research LLC 9 7 has raised-mere months after the ruling in Lawson-a
new question regarding § 1514A's protection for employees of private
companies who contract under Public Companies.98
In Gibney, the
plaintiff reported overbilling practices of the private contractor to a public
company. 99 The contractor argued that because it was not assisting the
public company with its fraud, the reported activity did not fall within the
scope of § 1514A.100 The court held that, despite the factual similarities
with Lawson,"" § 1514A did not extend to protect the employee in
Gibney.10 2 The court reasoned that the ruling in Lawson was specifically
tailored and focused on the mutual fund industry, and in Gibney a narrower
interpretation of § 1514A did not 'insulate the entire industry' from the
statute. 10 3 The court in Gibney further reasoned that in enacting Sox,
Congress was specifically focused on preventing fraud by public
companies on their shareholders, or through their contractors.1°4
Therefore, Congress did not intend for Sox to extend to cover shareholder
fraud enacted by private contractors againstpublic companies.'05
Another case limiting § 1514A in the wake of Lawson is Safarian
v. Am. DG Energy, Inc.1 06 Safarian dealt with an engineer who reported
possible fraud on the part of his company. 17 The Safarian court declined
97
98
99
100

25 F. Supp. 3d 741 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
See id. at 744-48 (questioning protection of new class of employees under § 1514A).
See id. at 746 (explaining reporting at issue).
See id. at 746-47 (detailing contractor's argument).

101 Compare Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1172-73 ("By inflating its expenses, and thus understating

its profits, [and thus FMR] could potentially increase the fees it would earn from the mutual
funds, fees ultimately paid by the shareholders of those funds." (quoting Brief for Petitioner 3))
with Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 741, 746 (detailing the over-billing practices resulting in fraud).
102 See Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (distinguishing Lawson).
103 See id. at 747-48 (distinguishing Lawson from Gibney).
104 See id. ("Sox 'was not intended to capture every complaint an employee might have as a
potential violation of the Act. Rather, the goal of the legislation was to protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities
laws."' (quoting Harvey v. Safeway, 2004 SOX 21, 2005 WL 4889073, at *3 (Dept. of Labor
Feb. 11 2005)) (internal citations omitted)).
105 Id.
106 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59684 (D. NJ April 30, 2014).
107 See id. at *11-13 (detailing fraud at issue). Here, the plaintiff specifically reported
overbilling customers, improper construction, fraudulent tax filings, and failure to obtain
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to extend protection to the employee. 0 8 The court interpreted § 1514A as
contemplating only employees actively involved in the accounting, legal, or
reporting roles in the company, who would have first-hand knowledge and
expertise to recognize alleged wrongdoing. 0 9 Because the plaintiff was an
engineer, the plaintiff was not a protected class of employee.11 0 Therefore,
though Lawson made clear that § 1514A applies broadly to public
companies and contractors alike, Safarian limited that interpretation to
apply to only certain classes of investors."'
Finally, another case that has continued where Lawson left off is
Wiest v. Lynch. 112 The court in Wiest held that the plaintiff had
satisfactorily plead an agency-based relationship to bring another
defendant, Tyco and Tyco, under the scope of Lawson.113 The court in
Wiest relied on the majority in Lawson, who reversed the First Circuit to
make explicit that § 1514A included employees of contractors and personal
employees of public company officers and employees. 114 The court in
Wiest also went on to say that it saw no reason that the protection spelled
out in Lawson, which extended from Public Companies to employees of
Contracted Companies to even personal employees of those officers or
employees, should
not extend further down an unbroken line of
115
employment.
The Roberts court in the securities context has shown an
entrenchment on procedure that has the effect of constraining federal court
litigation in favor of business. 116 Lawson, if interpreted as other academics
have, stands as a rare, partisan exception to that trend. 117 Successful
appellate litigators focus arguments on case-specific facts. 1 8

necessary permits. Id. at *3.
108 Id. at *13.
109 See id. at *12-14 (explaining scope of §1514A).
110 Id.
111 See Moberly Structural Model, supra note 27, at 1167 (explaining limitation of § 1514A).
112 15 F. Supp. 3d 543 (E.D. Pa 2014).
113 See id. at 558 (explaining holding).
114 See id. at 568-69 (relying on Lawson).
115 See id. (applying reasoning in Lawson).
116 See Coates, supra note 79, at 32 (detailing successful appellate arguments in current
judicial climate).
117 See id. (illustrating successful appellate arguments in current judicial climate); supra note
54 and accompanying text (listing initial opinions of Lawson).
118 See Coates, supra note 79, at 32 (detailing successful appellate arguments in current
judicial climate).
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VI. BRINGING WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF
PRIVATE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, POST-LAWSON
A. Arguing Against Defense Motion to Dismiss in FederalCourt
The Supreme Court in Lawson seemed to uphold the broadinterpretation of § 1514A, as described by Judge Thompson of the First
Circuit.11 9 The Court made it clear that "[a] contractor may not retaliate
against its own employee for engaging in protected whistleblowing
activity." 12 0
Despite this seemingly clear upholding of a broad
interpretation of § 1514A interpretation, subsequent litigators have argued
that courts have limited the reach of § 1514A siding with FMR's arguments
in Lawson which it would virtually insulate the mutual fund industry from
§ 1514A whistleblower protection. 121
Before the ink had dried on the FMR ruling, district courts across
the country were questioning the true scope of § 1514A's reach from the
FMR ruling. 122 The Third Circuit was one of the first circuits to do so, with
the Gibney.123 The court in Gibney grappled with the distinction between a
contractor assisting a public company with its own fraud, or a private
contractor conducting fraud unilaterally against the public entity.1 24 The
Third Circuit in Gibney has decided that this distinction is a critical
difference from the ruling in FMR, and that the § 1514A whistleblowing
provision will not apply to employees of contractors in instances of
unilateral, contractor fraud upon public companies. 125 Gibney, however,
took it even further, narrowing Lawson's interpretation of § 1514A to focus

119

See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1165 (agreeing with Judge Thompson's dissent in Lawson).

According to Judge Thompson's dissent in the First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
Lawson, 670 F.3d 61, to follow the narrower interpretation of § 1514A would be an unwarranted
"restriction on the intentionally broad language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act" and it would bar
significant classes of potential securities litigants from any legal protection. See 670 F.3d at 83
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (rejecting application of Lawson).
120 See 134 S. Ct. at 1166 (enlarging "view from the term 'an employee' to the provision as a
whole[]").
121 See supra Section IV.C (reviewing courts' differentiations from Lawson); see also
Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1170 (noting practical implications of FMR's argument for interpreting
limited scope for § 1514A).
122 See supra Section IV (outlining recent decisions questioning, challenging, or interpreting
FMR decision).
123 See Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (analyzing claims that fall within Sox).
124 See id.(analyzing claims that fall within Sox).
125 See id. (recognizing factual similarities in fraudulent activity, but distinguishing actors).
They further noted that Sox was concerned with preventing fraud enacted by public companies on
shareholders through private contractors, but fraud by private entities on public corporations was
not the envisioned scope of protection. Id.
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only on the mutual fund industry. 126
Courts like Gibney are not without support, such as academic Lisa
Krug. 127 Krug, like those circuits narrowing Lawson to apply only to
peculiar companies like mutual funds, advocates that public companies are
radically different form investment companies like mutual funds, and that
these require two different spheres of securities regulations. 121 What Krug
and those circuits have chosen to ignore, however, is that Enron's fraud
was conducted through private contractors and other business entitiessimilar in manner to the investment adviser's fraud in Lawson. 1 29 The
assumption that the use of contractors and subcontractors is particular to
mutual funds and investment companies in an extreme manner does not
bely the fact that public companies, like Enron, were able to utilize
contractors in much the same way.I30
When bringing a claim in court, a whistleblower's attorney will
want to emphasize the differences between the fraudsters in Enron and
those in Lawson."' While it is true that the factual situation in Lawson was
unique, at its basic level the fraud was committed against a public
company, the mutual fund, another employer, and FMR. 13 2 This is not
unlike Enron, where the fraud was not only committed by employees of the
public company, but also by its external accountants, Arthur Anderson
LLP.133 Sox was enacted specifically with the widespread fraud of Enron
in mind. 3 4 If these district courts' opinions were correct, 3 5 they would fail

126
127

See id. at 746-48 (limiting Sox application where one company is publicly held).
See Krug, supra note 8, at 1642-44 (arguing Court did not adequately consider

implications of Lawson).
128 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining origin of Sox); supra section IV.C
(explaining scope of § 1514A post Lawson).
129 See supra section II (emphasizing how Enron used outside accountants to "cook the
books"); see also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1169 (2014) (holding common
knowledge § 1514A was a direct response to Enron's accounting fraud).
130 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1169-70 (explaining how contractors and subcontractors
assisted Enron's Fraud).
131 See supra Section II (detailing Enron's collapse and its inspiring the enactment of
Sox);
supra Section IV.B (examining Supreme Court's Lawson decision). Should issues around a case
touch upon political sensitivities, it is also interesting to note that Sox was a bipartisan bill signed
into law by President George W. Bush, and viewed favorably as far-reaching. See Valerie
Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primerand a Critique, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 831-32 (2007) ("Bush signed the bill into law and touted the
Act as a 'far-reaching' reform of American business practices."). Sox was at least considered a
positive step from both political parties as a means to prevent future corporate fraud. See id.
(illustrating support for Sox).
132 See supra Section IV.A (examining inter alia factual background of Lawson).
133 See supra Section II (exploring commission of fraud in Enron's collapse, including by
external accountants, Arthur Anderson).
134 See supra Section II (exploring history of Sox, including Enron context).

The Lawson
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to protect employees of external companies who reported potential fraud
against the public company, such as accountants at Arthur Anderson
LLP. 13 6 The purpose of Sox is to prevent corporate fraud, like that
committed by Enron.117 This was only underscored by the Supreme Court
through its extensive examination of § 1514A. "' Lawson, therefore, stands
only to reemphasize the intended scope of Sox, and to broadly interpret
§1514A to extend to any employee who properly reports potential fraud
against a public company. 139
Finally, to hold the language as anything but inclusive would have
implications beyond mutual funds. 14 It would leave § 1514 with "a huge
hole . . . were the dissent's view of § 1514A's reach to prevail." 141 The
Court explicitly recognized in the following section that the reach they
interpreted from § 1514A was as inclusive as possible. 14 2 The Court's
recognition that the reach of § 1514A is extensive enough to extend to even
housekeepers of corporate executives, makes it clear that the Court
intended §1514A to have as much reach as possible if it involves corporate

fraud. 143
The Court noted that Congress included

"publically traded

decision specifically acknowledged the importance of Enron in the context and history of Sox's
enactment. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1169 (explaining intention of Sox was prevention of
another Enron debacle).
135 See supra Section IV.C (reviewing district courts questioning scope of Lawson).
136 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1169-71 (illustrating drawbacks of district court opinions).
While it is important to note that § 1514A contains language specifically including accountants,
the Court unambiguously held that this was not limited to those enumerated but included all
outside contractors. See id. (expanding definition of § 1514A).
137 See id. at 1169 (explaining intention of Sox was prevention of another Enron debacle);
supra Section II (discussing Enron's fraudulent activity and motivation for Sox).
138 See generally supra Section IV.B (analyzing Court's holding).
139 See supra Sections II and IV.C; see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 324-25 (1992) (using common law agency test).
140 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1168 (noting broad interpretation is necessary). The Court held
broad interpretation to be necessary not only to prevent mutual funds from escaping liability, but
also because finding otherwise would deny the protections intended by § 1514A to legions of
other professionals, including accountants and lawyers. See id. (finding § 1514A's vital function
only works when protecting those who could report).
141 Id.
142 ld. at 1167-68.
Although they wrote it off as more theoretical than real, the Court
recognized that their interpretation of the statute would include "housekeepers" and "gardeners,"
although they acknowledged few such employees would ever likely come upon and comprehend
evidence of their employer's complicity in corporate fraud. Id.
143 See id. (rejecting FMR's limitation on § 1514A; Watnick, supra note 1311,
at 832
(reciting purpose of the act is reaching corporate actors). The Court, in other words, upheld
Congress's attempt to "press[] corporate officers, directors, and other employees into service,
enlisting them as 'foot soldiers' in the fight against corporate fraud." Watnick, supra note 1311,
at 832.
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companies" as a discrete category of companies required to file reports
under "section 15(d)." 144 In this context-included in congress's definition
of §1514A by including "publicly traded companies"-it is necessary to
understand that the only "corporate insiders" would be those contractors
who manage the mutual funds' operations. 14 5 The intention of Congress
was to regulate public companies, explicitly, including but not limited to
mutual funds.146 The Court included this section because in order for Sox
to be effective with companies, including mutual funds, it must extend to
the contractors, which in the mutual fund industry include investment
managers, accountants, and more.147
The second reason the Court explicitly addressed §1514A's
application to mutual funds was to address concerns raised about mutual
funds being separately regulated by the Investment Advisers Act. 148 The
Court first pointed out that while the Act did cover Mutual Fund advisers,
separate regulation does not remove the problems Sox intended to solve.149
150
Furthermore, the '40 Act contains no whistleblower protection clause.
The Court therefore examined Mutual Funds in the context of the Lawson
case specifically to overrule the fallacious reasoning of the Court of
Appeals, not to limit its own interpretation of § 1514A to mutual funds. 151
Between the text, the history, and the intent of Sox, the Court had
made it clear that §1514A was not meant to be limited, and instead that
§1514A should be interpreted to its fullest as a means of protecting
whistleblowers for the purpose of promoting, preventing, or correcting
corporate fraud. 152 This sentiment was echoed a decade later with
Congress's passing of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protecting Provision,
153
aimed explicitly at financial institutions but also at businesses at large.
144 See supra note 1433 and accompanying text. They also delve into the complex structure
of financial vehicles like mutual funds: corporations with virtually no employees that contract out
corporate functions. Watnik, supra note 131, at 842.
145 Id.
146 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1168 (extending § 1514A to petitioners, without limiting to
mutual funds). But see id. at 1183 (discussing in depth importance of holding to regulating
mutual fund industry).
147 See id. at 1176 (applying § 15 14A to employees of contractor without limiting to mutual
funds).
148 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (recognizing Mutual funds regulated by both
Investment Advisers Act and Sox).
149 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1168 (addressing §1514A's application to mutual funds).
150 See generally Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-21 (1940) (lacking
Whistleblower Protection clause).
151 See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1160 (holding textual differences were not overwhelming).
152 See id. at 1162 (explaining scope of § 1514A).
153 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2010) (preventing retaliation against whistleblowers).
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Additionally, Congress reaffirmed the Act's significance as a
whistleblowing protection by lessening the burden on employee
154
whistleblowers by adding to §1514A the language "reasonably believes."
Between the two statutes and the Court's ruling, it is clear that both the
legislative and judicial branches of government intended to promote the
protection of employees as a means to the more important end of corporate
55
fraud. 1
However, as illustrated in Section IV.C, some district courts have
continued to interpret these statutes narrowly, at least in the initial wake of
Lawson. 1 56 This seems to offer some merit to employers seeking to defend
employee terminations in these jurisdictions. 157 Wrongful termination or
constructive discharge can be difficult claims to prove in court. 158 It is
unnecessary to limit those provisions to prevent over-protection. 159 The
courts and legislature determined these classes need all the protection they
this protection so that information flows
can get. 160 Ultimately, they need 161
freely, preventing the next Enron.
B. Choosing Venue
Although contractor-employees should be covered under § 1514A,
especially after the Lawson decision, it is important as a practitioner
bringing such claims to recognize that this area of law is not yet settled. 162
Without a grant of certiorari, an employee could lose a case brought in a
circuit currently limiting interpretation of §1514A. 16
Therefore, if the
employee-claim is brought in a district that has entertained adopting a
limiting interpretation, it will be prudent to wait for and proceed with the
Department of Labor and the administrative courts, rather than removing to
federal district court. 164 Alternatively, if the Department of Labor does not
154 See Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 2-4 (explaining addition of language and significance
during litigation).
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (protecting whistleblowers); Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1162
(noting Congress's efforts on ending corporate fraud).
156 See supra Section IV.C (demonstrating district courts' narrow interpretations of Lawson).
157 Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1187 (noting lower courts).
158 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
159 See Zuckerman, supra note 11, at 2-4 (explaining broad intention of protections).
160 See supra Section II (describing motivation behind §1514A was encouraging employees
and whistleblowers without fearing retaliation).
161 See supra Section II (describing motivation behind §1514A was encouraging employees
and whistleblowers without fearing retaliation).
162 See supra Section IV (detailing some circuits limiting scope of §1514A).
163 See supra Section IV (identifying circuits rejecting contractor-employee claims).
164 See supra Section III (elaborating on procedure under Sox).
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choose to pursue the claim for some reason, careful examination of the
circuits a plaintiff could potentially file in should take place. 165
VII. BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYERS SHOULD
DEVELOP INTERNAL REPORTING PROGRAMS
As detailed above, private companies should not take it for granted

66
that they are immune from the protective measures of § 1514A.1
Proactive steps will enable private employers to sidestep the expense of
even litigating, let alone being subject to § 1514A. I 6 Private companies
should follow public companies, if they have not already, in creating
policies to encourage internal reporting of potential issues or violations of
law. 16 The policy can be simple, or complex, depending on the regulatory
pressures faced by the private company and other germane whistleblowing
laws. 16 9 However, it should at the very least establish an unofficial
"hotline"-that is, a point of contact who is independent from employees
immediate supervisors. 1 70
By encouraging internal reporting to an
independent ombudsman-type position, private employers can address
problems quickly and privately, and ensure that the employees' rights are
not violated for coming forward. 11

Not only is internal reporting valuable for private companies to
proactively prevent violations of Sox (or other statutes), it also serves a
crucial business purpose: internal communication. I1 2 Although there are a
165 See supra Section II (describing motivation behind §1514A was encouraging employees
and whistleblowers without fearing retaliation).
166 See supra Section V (examining Lawson's impact on private employers who conduct
business with public companies).
167 See Bill Libit, Elements of an Effective Whistleblower Hotline, HLS F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (Oct. 15, 2015) http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/25/elementsof-an-effective-whistleblower-hotline ("It is more crucial than ever that companies have effective
whistleblower hotlines as part of their corporate compliance programs so that employees (and
other company stakeholders, such as vendors) are motivated to report suspected unethical or
unlawful conduct internally and not incentivized to first turn to regulators").
168 See, Public Counsel Law Center, WHISTLEBLOWER POLICY FOR A CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
BENEFIT NONPROFIT CORPORATION

http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/publications/files/wbpolicy.pdf
(last visited August 15,
2015).
169 Id.
170 See id. at Appendix B, Article II (recognizing potential complications with reporting if
employee's supervisor is wrongdoer).
But see Libit, supra note 1677 ("[A]n internal
whistleblower hotline is a critical component of a company's anti-fraud program, as tips are
consistently the most common method of detecting fraud.").
171 See Libit, supra note 1677 (explaining need for internal reporting capabilities).
172 See, e.g., David Brown, Internal Communications Should be of Vital Importance to any
Business, ALBANY Bus. REV., Aug. 19, 2002,
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number of different types of internal communication that are important to a
business's success, each serving a different purpose, creating a system so
that employees of all levels of the company can submit data they believe
important to the business as a whole will help any enterprise accomplish
this goal.1 3 Although it is not necessarily the role of lawyers to tell
businesses how to gather information or promote internal communication,
creating even a rudimentary whistleblower reporting system can be utilized
for much more, and can be used not only as a proactive method to avoid

http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2002/08/19/focus7.html (noting benefits of internal
communication including positive corporate cultural, employee moral, productivity, and
operational success); Kevin Bassett, How Important is Internal Communication in my Business?,
ENTREPRENEUR MAG., May 22, 2014, http://www.entrepreneurmag.co.za/askentrepreneur/hiring-and-managing- staff-ask-entrepreneur/how-important-is-internalcommunication-in-my-business/ ("FEIEA's (the Federation of Business Communicator
Associations in Europe) recently announced headline results of its latest survey among nearly 5
000 practicing workplace communicators highlights the above findings of internal
communications being a key success factor for 79% of organisations "). Furthermore, it is
estimated that almost two thirds of all U.S. companies lose approximately 1.2% of their annual
revenue to fraud. See Libit, supra note 167 ("Indirect costs associated with fraud, such as
reputational damage and costs associated with investigation and remediation of the fraudulent
acts, may also be substantial."). Moreover, an internal reporting program can be structured to
function as more than just an internal hotline-it can, for instance, also operate as a help line for
employees. See id. ("Companies should expand the reasons an employee may contemplate
calling the hotline, such as having the hotline also serve as a helpline, as this may alter the
perception or negativity associated with hotlines and facilitate reducing the fear of calling and the
associated stigma."). The reporting channel can also be used to let employees report efficiency
suggestions, quality concerns, and much more. See id. (explaining uses for hotlines).
173 See Communications Strategies to Engage a Variety of Stakeholders: An Enterprise RentA-Car
Case
Study
http://businesscasestudies.co.uk/enterprise-rent-a-car/communicationstrategies-to-engage-a-variety-of-stakeholders/internal-communications.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2015) (noting Enterprise's utilizing intranet to promote internal communication, including
suggestions for best practices). This communication need not even be a hotline, but can be
accomplished in other ways.
Id. Three ways that a company can promote internal
communication through implementing a whistleblowing reporting system, be it a hotline, a
designated employee, or an intranet similar to the one Enterprise utilized, include encouraging
employees to share information, creating an open dialogue by regularly updating employees on
key information, and making the company culture one of openness to suggestion and ideas for
improvement. See id.; Jennifer Miller, 7 Ways to Improve Internal Communication at Your
Business, THE PEOPLE EQUATION (Apr. 29, 2013), http://people-equation.com/7-ways-toimprove-internal-communication-at-yourbusiness/?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=email&utm campaign=Feed%3A+ThePeople
Equation+%28The+People+Equation%29
(discussing
improvements
to
internal
communications). Furthermore, these forms of intra-company communication can serve as a
check and guide to company management, as it can highlight potential issues that may not even
yet register to management as potential problems or unethical conduct. See Dan Mayfield.,
Former Enron CFO: "I wasn't thinking this was fraud," HOUSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, Nov. 26,
2014 ("But, Fastow was also there to explain that the same things he thought were completely
above board, the same sketchy accounting methods that other Fortune 10 companies use, got him
and his company in deep water. Still, he says, 'I cannot ever remember an instance where I set
out to commit fraud. I didn't."').
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potential employment-related litigation, but also as a means to gather data
and open channels of communication to all levels of the enterprise. 174
A policy or program to comply with § 1514A has a downside, but
this downside is the far lesser evil compared to the alternative, and as
mentioned above can be utilized for business purposes beyond complying
with Sox.i1 5 Establishing a whistleblower policy can potentially be the
basis for a breach of contract claim. 1 76 However, violations of Sox may
regardless be the basis for a common law tort claim, and such a claim may
not be subject to the procedural limits of Sox. 1 77 Generally speaking,
damages for contract claims are more limited than torts, and notably are not
subject to the possibility of punitive damages. 1 78 Furthermore, in crafting
the whistleblower policy, the company is able to better control the nature of
any potential litigation (although the program itself should limit the
potential of such an action to begin with). 171 It is better therefore to create
such a policy and program, because it enables the company to limit
possible damages in the totality, reduce the likelihood of litigation in
general, and control any such matter before trouble even arises.180 With
these benefits, and the ability of a company to control and limit future
litigation, it is in the interest of private companies, if they have not already,
to consider establishing whistleblowing procedures and to foster such
174 See
programs).
175 See
176 See
177 See

supra note 1733 (demonstrating how attorneys should recommend whistleblowing
Hartsfield, supra note 49.
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Hartsfield, supra note 49 (citing Romaneck v. Deutsche Asset Mgmt., No. C05-2473,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33712 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2005)).
178 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin
T. Wells, The Predictabilityof Punitive Damages, 26 (S2) THE J. OF LEGAL STUD., 623, 654
(June 1997) (examining punitive damages in tort context).
179 Id.
180 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (detailing importance of internal
communications and ability to use whistleblowing channels to such ends). In fact, nearly 80% of
all whistleblowers blew the whistle in-house first, before reporting to the SEC under the DoddFrank Whistleblowing Regime. See Mary Jo White, SEC Chairwoman, Speech at Ray Garrett
Jr. Corporeateand Securities Law Institute at Northwestern University Law School, INV. NEWS 5
(Apr. 30,
2015)
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150517/REG/305179990/secswhistleblower-program-is-a-game-changer). Companies should take advantage of this and utilize
internal communication to nip problems in the bud. See Rohit Mahajan, Lead by Example:
Making Whistleblowing Programs Successful in Corporate India, DELOITTE 5 (June 2014)
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/finance/in- fa-whistleblowingsurvey-2014-noexp.pdf. "Organisations must understand that whistleblowing is, perhaps, the
only tool that comes close to pointing out a fraud in its nascent stages. It is, therefore, important
to build, monitor and nurture this channel continuously." Ild. However, guidelines frequently
suggest engaging independent third parties when implementing Whistleblower Protection
programs. See generally Libit, supra note 1677 (advocating outsourcing whistleblower programs
to third parties).
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internal communication.
VIII. HOW PUBLIC COMPANIES SHOULD PROCEED
Public companies should recognize that Lawson represents an
expansion of Sox.181 Although most if not all public companies already
have whistleblower protection programs as part of the anti-fraud
requirements of Sox, these companies should reevaluate the scope of their
whistleblower reporting channels.
Public companies should extend
channels to report potential fraud not only to employees, but also to
contractors, contractors' employees, and to third party vendors. Although
likely a large pool of potential reports, it can be easier to sort through these
reports by utilizing sorting technology and third party reporting programs.
Expanding reporting programs in this manner will ensure continued
compliance with § 1514A post-Lawson.
IX. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court seemed to establish that § 1514A was to
be interpreted broadly with its decision in Lawson, instead that decision
sparked an immediate skepticism among districts confronted by § 1514A
claims immediately following the Lawson decision. The district courts
differentiated their holdings from Lawson in different ways, but generally
there was an emphasis on the specific factual nature of Lawson where it
dealt with fraud on mutual funds, companies with very unique criteria
compared to most corporations. However, these courts incorrectly rejected
what the Court intended in Lawson. The Court in Lawson asserted a broad
scope of protection under § 1514A to encourage reporting by employees of
public and private employers when reporting potential fraud against public
companies. This decision was consistent with the intent and language of §
1514A, and promoted the goals of corporate transparency and anti-fraud
provisions.
Attorneys confronted by § 1514A related litigation should be
careful when initiating or responding to these cases. Although the Court's
decision in Lawson seems to clearly stand for protecting employees of
private employers (at least when the fraud affects a public company), some
early decisions in the wake of Lawson have shown that this may be
questioned in certain districts. Plaintiff's attorneys should consider choice
of venue carefully to ensure a friendly district, and defense counsel should

181 See generally supra section III (examining Lawson decision).
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focus on differentiating their case from Lawson by focusing on the unique
attributes of fraud on mutual funds. Although this paper argues that those
arguments should be incorrect, they have gained at least preliminary
traction in certain districts lending at least some merit to such arguments.
Finally, counsel for private employers should consider
recommending an internal reporting system for their companies. Reporting
systems are not without their costs. However, the costs of not having such
a system may be much greater. Without an internal reporting mechanism,
for example, an employee may report perceived violations or potential
fraud to regulators or law enforcement. The costs of responding to the
government, or the costs of negative press, may be far greater than the costs
of operating an internal reporting protocol. Furthermore, § 1514A and
other whistleblower statutes grant employees the ability to pursue
additional damages for retaliation, adding further legal costs to violations
of whistleblower protection statutes. Internal reporting protocol may allow
companies to appropriately respond to such claims and avoid violation of
these statutes.
Internal reporting mechanisms may also serve a positive purpose.
If well designed and given the resources required, they can serve as a
communication conduit from lower level employees to higher level. This
conduit of information can help arm executives with a greater spread of
information, rather than what each chain of management report upwardsundoubtedly with a spin most positive to the reporter. Armed with greater
knowledge, it can help executives make decisions and grow their
companies. Lawson should therefore not only sound as a warning, but also
as an opportunity. An opportunity to foster a greater culture of openness,
an opportunity to gather more information in an age where information is
the cutting edge of business, and an opportunity to boost employee morale
by providing a means to feel heard. Such programs may not fit the needs
of every private employer, but with the potential for value from preventing
whistleblowing-related costs and from developing greater internal
communication, they should not be lightly dismissed either.
Although the full scope of § 1514A may not be definitely
established yet, Lawson stands for a big win for employees and investors
alike, and the only true losers are those relying on codes of silence to
operate inappropriately.
Allen K. Barrett

